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I. GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND EMERGING ECONOMIES
Globalization has given rise to a new era of international competition
that is best understood by looking at the global organization of industries
and the ways in which countries rise and fall within these industries.1 The
global value chain (GVC) framework has evolved from its academic
origins to become a major paradigm used by a wide range of international
organizations, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID). Using core concepts like
“governance” and “upgrading,” GVCs highlight the ways in which new
patterns of international trade, production, and employment shape
prospects for development and competitiveness.
GVC analysis documents the international expansion and geographic
fragmentation of contemporary production networks and focuses primarily
on the issues of industry (re)organization, coordination, governance, and
power in the chain.2 Its concern is to understand the causes and
consequences of the organizational reconfiguration taking place in global
industries.3 The GVC approach also explores the broader institutional
context of these linkages, including trade policy, regulation, and standards.
In the past two decades, profound changes in the structure of the
global economy have reshaped global production and trade and have
altered the organization of industries and national economies.4 As supply
chains become global in scope, more intermediate goods are being traded
across borders, and more imported parts and components are being
integrated into exports.5 In 2009, world exports of intermediate goods
exceeded the combined export values of final and capital goods for the first
time, representing 51% of non-fuel merchandise exports.6 Because of the
1. Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains and International Competition, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 37,
37 (2011).
2. Id. at 39.
3. The seminal publication is COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM (Gary Gereffi &
Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994) (applying the global commodity chains concept for the first time to a
broad range of contemporary industries). In the early 2000s, the global commodity chains research
agenda helped to spawn the closely related global value chain and global production network
approaches. Jennifer Bair, Global Commodity Chains: Genealogy and Review, in FRONTIERS OF
COMMODITY CHAIN RESEARCH 2–14 (Jennifer Bair ed., 2009).
4. Gary Gereffi & Timothy Sturgeon, Global Value Chains and Industrial Policy: The Role of
Emerging Economies, in GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD 329, 329 (Deborah K. Elms
& Patrick Low eds., 2013), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4tradeglobal
value13_e.pdf.
5. Id.; see also Robert C. Feenstra, Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the
Global Economy, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 31, 39–40.
6. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329; see also WORLD TRADE ORG. & INST. OF
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unique ability of the GVC framework to show how international supply
chains link economic activities at global, regional, national, and local levels
within particular industries, international organizations such as the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World
Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are utilizing the GVC approach to
structure new donor initiatives and data collection programs on global trade
and development.7
Emerging economies are playing significant and diverse roles in
GVCs.8 During the 2000s, they became major exporters of intermediate
and final manufactured goods (China, South Korea, and Mexico) and
primary products (Brazil, Russia, and South Africa). However, market
growth in emerging economies has also led to shifting end markets in
GVCs, as more trade has occurred between developing economies (often
referred to as South-South trade in the literature), especially since the
2008–09 economic recession.9 China has been the focal point of both
trends: it is the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods and the
world’s largest importer of many raw materials, thereby contributing to the
primary product export boom.
II. THE RISE OF GVCS
In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. retailers and brand-name companies
joined manufacturers in the search for offshore suppliers of most categories
of consumer goods, which led to a fundamental shift from what had been
“producer-driven” commodity chains, which include capital- and
technology-intensive industries like automobiles and electronics, to “buyerDEVELOPING ECONOMIES-JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., TRADE PATTERNS AND GLOBAL VALUE
CHAINS IN EAST ASIA: FROM TRADE IN GOODS TO TRADE IN TASKS 81 (2011) [hereinafter WTO &
IDE-JETRO], available at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Press/ pdf/20110606_news.pdf.
7. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329; see, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade &
Dev. [UNCTAD], Global Value Chains and Development: Investment and Value Added Trade in the
Global Economy: A Preliminary Analysis, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/2013/1 (Feb. 27, 2013),
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diae2013d1_en.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., INTERCONNECTED ECONOMIES: BENEFITING FROM GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
(2013), available at http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/10157/46174/Interconnected_
economies.pdf; THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A POSTCRISIS WORLD: A
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE (Olivier Cattaneo, Gary Gereffi & Cornelia Staritz eds., 2010), available
at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8499-2; WORLD ECON. FORUM,
ENABLING TRADE: VALUING GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES (2013), available at http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_SCT_EnablingTrade_Report_2013.pdf.
8. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 351.
9. Id.; see also Cornelia Staritz et al., Editorial, 4 INT’L J. TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING,
INNOVATION & DEV. 1, 1–11 (2011) (analyzing multiple industry and country cases of shifting end
markets and South-South trade in GVCs).
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driven” chains, which include a broad range of consumer products like
apparel, footwear, toys, and sporting goods.10 The geography of these
chains expanded from regional production-sharing arrangements to fullfledged global supply chains, with a growing emphasis on East Asia.11 In
the 1960s and 1970s, large, vertically integrated transnational corporations
dominated the landscape in most international industries,12 and the
prevailing development strategy was import-substituting industrialization
(ISI). Well established in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia
since the 1950s, ISI was a state-led effort to build domestic industries by
requiring foreign manufacturers to replace imports with locally-made
products, beginning with the assembly of final goods and working back to
key components, in return for guaranteed market access.13 These domestic
industrial policies were intended to nurture a set of full-blown national
industries in key sectors that could significantly reduce, if not fully
eliminate, imports from the industrialized nations.14
The death knell for ISI, especially in Latin America, came from the oil
shock of the late 1970s and the severe debt crisis that followed it.15 The ISI
approach was creating large and persistent trade deficits because the
manufacturing sectors in ISI countries were simply importing intermediate
goods rather than reducing imports altogether, and escalating debt service
payments led to a net outflow of foreign capital that crippled economic
growth in the 1980s.

10. Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World, 21 REV. INT’L
POL. ECON. 9, 10 (2014).
11. Id.; see also Gary Gereffi, Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia,
12 J. ASIAN BUS. 75 (1996) (describing the distinct roles played by Japan and the East Asian “tigers”—
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—in the development of East Asia’s export-oriented
development model); Gary Gereffi, The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How
U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks, in COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL
CAPITALISM 95 (Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994) [hereinafter The Organization of
Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains] (introducing the classic typology of buyer-driven and
producer-driven commodity chains).
12. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 10; see also RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 7–18 (1971) (offering the first systematic empirical
study of multinational enterprises in the post-war era).
13. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 10; see also Gary Gereffi, The International Economy and
Economic Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 160, 211–12, 215–16 (Neil J.
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994) (identifying the key features distinguishing Latin American
and East Asian ISI and EOI development strategies).
14. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329–30.
15. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 11; see also Victor L. Urquidi, The Prospects for Economic
Transformation in Latin America: Opportunities and Resistances, LATIN AM. STUD. ASS’N F., Fall
1991, at 1, 3 (discussing the rise in interest rates for loans to Latin American governments, which
undermined their ability to deal with the accumulated trade deficits caused by ISI policies).
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Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank, many developing countries made the transition from ISI to
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) during the 1980s.16 This new
outward-oriented development model focused on exports to the global
market by local firms, and it removed the state requirement that foreign
firms had to produce for protected domestic markets, which had mainly
benefitted larger developing economies.17 There was an equally profound
reorientation in the strategies of transnational corporations. The rapid
expansion of industrial capabilities and export propensities in a diverse
array of newly industrializing economies in Asia and Latin America
encouraged transnational companies to accelerate their own efforts to
outsource relatively standardized activities to lower-cost production
locations worldwide. Precisely this change in the strategies of transnational
companies enabled the shift from ISI to EOI in developing economies, and
it corresponds with the shift from producer-driven to buyer-driven
commodity chains at the level of global industries.18
The rise of GVCs occurred in a period of falling trade barriers, the
emergence of the WTO, and the policy prescriptions associated with the
“Washington Consensus”—i.e., that governments had only to provide a
strong set of “horizontal” policies (such as education, infrastructure, and
macroeconomic stability) and be open to trade in order to succeed.19 Of
course, many observers noted that the dynamic emerging economies did
much more than establish a set of economy-wide enabling institutions for
growth. They frequently also targeted key domestic industries for support,
under either ISI or EOI policies that tended to alternate over time in both
Latin American and East Asian nations.20
Today, industrial policy is on the upswing.21 WTO accession often
comes with allowances for selective industrial policies (e.g., trade
16. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 11; see also Gary Gereffi, Paths of Industrialization: An Overview,
in MANUFACTURING MIRACLES: PATHS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 3
(Gary Gereffi & Donald L. Wyman eds., 1990) (reviewing the determinants and timing of different
types of ISI and EOI in Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan).
17. Gereffi, supra note 13, at 215–19.
18. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 11; see also Gereffi, supra note 11, at 97–99 (comparing buyerdriven and producer-driven commodity chains).
19. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329.
20. Id.; see also Richard Baldwin, Trade and Industrialisation After Globalisation’s 2nd
Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different and Why It Matters 6 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17716, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17716.pdf (arguing that successful industrialization before 1985 meant
building a domestic supply chain, in contrast to the subsequent emphasis in export-oriented economies
on using offshore production to “join” global supply chains).
21. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 330.
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promotion, local content rules, taxes, tariffs, and more indirect programs
that drive local production) to remain in force for specified periods.
Bilateral trade agreements can supersede such allowances under WTO
rules, and a handful of relatively large and advanced emerging economies
(such as those in the G-20) that have more clout in the institutions of global
governance are using them to create policy space to design and implement
activist industrial policies.
The organization of global industries into GVCs in which production
and trade networks are spread across many countries and regions has
reinvigorated industrial policy debates. There is not likely to be a return to
the ISI and EOI policies of old. Domestic industries in both industrialized
and developing countries no longer stand alone, competing mainly through
arm’s length trade. Instead, they have become deeply intertwined through
complex, overlapping business networks created through recurrent waves
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and global sourcing. Companies,
localities, and entire countries have come to occupy specialized niches
within GVCs. Because of this, today’s industrial policies have a different
character and generate different outcomes than before. Intentionally or not,
governments currently engage in GVC-oriented industrialization when
targeting key sectors for growth.
New governance structures reinforce the organizational consolidation
occurring within GVCs and the geographic concentration associated with
the growing prominence of emerging economies as key economic and
political actors.22 After 1989, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the opening
of China to international investment and trade, and the liberalization of
India brought a number of very large economies onto the global stage,
known initially as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). The rise of the
BRICs spurred the globalization process, as GVCs began to focus their
investment and sourcing operations in big and dynamic emerging
economies that offered abundant raw materials, large pools of low-wage
workers, highly capable manufacturers, and rapidly growing domestic
markets.
Faced with slow growth at home, large lead firms in GVCs rushed to
set up operations in BRIC countries, especially China, in an effort to carve
out brand recognition and market share in rapidly expanding consumer
markets and to cut costs on goods produced for export back to home
markets.23 In producer-driven chains, the lead firms that to a large degree
defined the structure of these industries were largely global manufacturers

22. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 15.
23. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 331.
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like General Motors, Ford, IBM, and HP.24 In buyer-driven chains, the
lead firms were a mix of retailers (like Walmart, JCPenney, and Carrefour),
global marketers (such as Nike, Liz Claiborne, and Polo Ralph Lauren),
and supermarkets and food multinationals (like Tesco and Nestlé).25 The
lead firms in buyer-driven chains were particularly influential in the
globalization process because they accelerated the process of “global
sourcing” based on orders from developed countries, which relied almost
entirely on production carried out in developing economies.26
As retailers and branded manufacturers in wealthy countries became
more experienced with global sourcing, developing countries enhanced
their infrastructure, and suppliers in those countries upgraded their
capabilities in response to larger orders for more complex goods.27 In the
1990s, many U.S.- and Europe-based manufacturers quickly became huge
global players, with facilities in scores of locations around the world (e.g.,
Siemens, Valeo, Flextronics). A handful of elite East Asian suppliers (e.g.,
Pao Chen, Quanta, Foxconn) and trading companies (e.g., Li & Fung) also
took on more tasks for multinational affiliates and global buyers. These
firms expanded production throughout Asia and more recently in Africa,
Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
Lead firms themselves are getting bigger and increasing their global
market shares through mergers, acquisitions, and the decline of many
rivals.28 This has been coupled with a growing recognition of the strategic
vulnerabilities of global supply chains: the risk of single-source
relationships and the danger of lead firms losing access to critical inputs
and raw material supplies.29 This is particularly apparent in the agrifoods
sector, in which consumer goods firms such as Cadbury, Coca-Cola, and
Unilever are expanding their direct involvement in the procurement and
sustainability of the raw material sides of their value chains, such as those
24. The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains, supra note 11, at 97.
25. Id. at 97–99.
26. See Gary Gereffi, International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity
Chain, 48 J. INT’L ECON. 37, 44–49 (1999) (identifying retailers, branded marketers, and branded
manufacturers as three types of “lead firms” engaged in global sourcing in buyer-driven commodity
chains).
27. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 331; see also Gary G. Hamilton & Gary Gereffi, Global
Commodity Chains, Market Makers, and the Rise of Demand-Responsive Economies, in FRONTIERS OF
COMMODITY CHAIN RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 136, 153–59 (describing how U.S., European, and
Japanese buyers worked with suppliers in South Korea and Taiwan to create the necessary conditions
for expanding and diversifying exports of a broad array of consumer goods in both economies).
28. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 16.
29. Id.; see also BARRY C. LYNN, END OF THE LINE: THE RISE AND COMING FALL OF THE
GLOBAL CORPORATION 177–79, 211–15 (2005) (underscoring the vulnerability of companies and
consumers to disruptions in global supply chains caused by both predictable and uncontrollable factors).
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involving cocoa, coffee, and sugar. This is also evident in the automobile
and electronics industries, in which concern about the availability of raw
materials such as lithium and coltan,30 respectively, are spurring greater
engagement between GVC lead firms and host country suppliers and
governments. These examples suggest that a number of GVCs, especially
in natural resource-based industries, are giving greater attention to strategic
collaboration as a counterweight to the long-term trend toward
specialization and fragmentation of supply chains.
III. GOVERNANCE AND UPGRADING IN GVCS
The GVC framework focuses on globally expanding supply chains
and how value is created and captured therein.31 By analyzing the full
range of activities that firms and workers perform to bring a specific
product from its conception to its end use and beyond,32 the GVC approach
provides a holistic view of global industries from two contrasting vantage
points: top-down and bottom-up.33 The key concept for the top-down view
is the “governance” of global value chains, which focuses mainly on lead
firms and the organization of global industries; the main concept for the
bottom-up perspective is “upgrading,” which focuses on the strategies used
by countries, regions, and other economic stakeholders to maintain or
improve their positions in the global economy.34
The concept of governance is the centerpiece of GVC analysis.35 It
examines the ways in which corporate power can actively shape the
distribution of profits and risk in an industry and the actors who exercise
such power through their activities. Power in GVCs is exerted by lead
firms. In the governance typology outlined in Figure 1, the market and
hierarchy poles of the GVC governance continuum are driven by price and
ownership within vertically integrated firms, respectively.36 The remaining
three categories are stable forms of network governance (modular,

30. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 16; see also DEV NATHAN & SANDIP SARKAR, BLOOD ON YOUR
MOBILE PHONE? CAPTURING THE GAINS FOR ARTISANAL MINERS, POOR WORKERS AND WOMEN 2
(Capturing the Gains, Briefing Note 2, 2011), available at http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg_
briefing_note_2.pdf (documenting the labor abuses endemic to coltan mining in Africa).
31. Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly Cares About Global Supply Chains,
48 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 24, 25 (2012).
32. Id.; see also, e.g., Karina Fernandez-Stark, Penny Bamber & Gary Gereffi, The Offshore
Services Value Chain: Upgrading Trajectories in Developing Countries, 4 INT’L J. TECHNOLOGICAL
LEARNING, INNOVATION & DEV. 206, 209–11 (2011).
33. Gereffi, supra note 1, at 39.
34. Id. at 39–40.
35. Gereffi & Lee, supra note 31, at 25.
36. See infra Figure 1.
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relational, and captive), in which different kinds of GVC lead firms control
to a large degree the ways in which global supply chains operate and the
main winners and losers within these chains.
While governance issues have attracted a good deal of attention
among GVC scholars, the research on economic upgrading has been at
least as important because many of the people who use the GVC
framework have a very strong development focus.37
“Economic
upgrading” is defined as the process by which economic actors—firms and
workers—move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in
GVCs.38 The challenge of economic upgrading in GVCs is to identify the
conditions under which developing and developed countries and firms can
“climb the value chain” from basic assembly activities using low-cost and
unskilled labor to more advanced forms of “full package” supply and
integrated manufacturing.39
IV. CONNECTING GVCS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
GVCs matter for economic development in several ways, since the
ability of countries to prosper depends on their participation in the global
economy, which is largely a story about their role in GVCs.40 Connecting
countries to GVCs involves both investment and trade, which both rely
heavily on efficient global supply chains in order to contribute to growth.41
A key factor in such efficiency is infrastructure development, which
enables global trade though the construction and improvement of the
physical facilities that link national economies: ports and canals, airports,
roads, and a wide range of information and communication technologies.42
Improving trade flows at the border can be enhanced by infrastructure
investments inside the border (i.e., in roads and facilities that connect rural
regions and small firms to larger domestic markets) and also by
investments beyond the border, especially in infrastructure facilities that
connect a country to its nearby neighbors in regional supply chains.43
37. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 9.
38. Gary Gereffi, The Global Economy: Organization, Governance, and Development, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 160, 171 (N.J. Smelser & R. Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005).
39. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 10.
40. Gereffi & Lee, supra note 25, at 24.
41. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 7, at 13 (demonstrating that reducing supply chain
barriers to trade could increase gross domestic product up to six times more than could removing
tariffs).
42. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: MAPPING THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY 400–06 (6th ed. 2011); WTO & IDE-JETRO, supra note 6, at 28, 30.
43. Frederick Mayer & William Milberg, Aid for Trade in a World of Global Value Chains:
Chain Power, the Distribution of Rents, and Implications for the Form of Aid 9–10 (Capturing the
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These regional markets are often underappreciated because of the
importance given to developed country markets in the 1990s and early
2000s, but in the current era, regional value chains are becoming a new
focus for investment planning by development banks and international
organizations.44
GVC studies are pervasive in academic publications that examine a
wide range of global industries.45 The framework has also been adopted by
many of the most important international organizations concerned with
economic development, such as the WTO, UNCTAD, the OECD, the
World Bank, and the World Economic Forum.46 The international
institutions that have provided the underpinning for the Washington
Consensus (such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO) and major
bilateral donors (such as USAID and the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID)) have embraced new models of
development thinking, with an emphasis on sectoral analysis that links
macro issues such as international trade and investment more closely with
the micro development issues of employment, gender dynamics, and
sustainable livelihoods.47 In addition, new alliances have emerged among
diverse UN and other international agencies (such as the World Bank and
the ILO) to promote joint research agendas that explore the links between
economic and social upgrading, explicitly using the GVC framework.48
This is an area in which GVC analysis and supply chain management
research can be mutually beneficial.49 Sophisticated value chain data
disaggregated by business functions can complement existing country-level
trade statistics and industry-level input-output data, providing a clear

Gains, Working Paper 34, 2013), available at http://www.capturingthegains.org/publications/working
papers/wp_201334.htm.
44. Gereffi & Lee, supra note 62, at 28–29.
45. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 23.
46. Id.; see also supra notes 6–7.
47. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 23; see also, e.g., MAKING VALUE CHAINS WORK BETTER FOR THE
POOR: A TOOLBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS OF VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS 1–4 (Tim Purcell et al. eds.,
2008), available at http://aciar.gov.au/publication/cop019 (providing a better understanding of how
markets work, using the principles of value chain analysis); GENDER DEV. UNIT, INT’L TRADE DEV.,
THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS, ECONOMIC UPGRADING, AND GENDER: CASE STUDIES OF
THE HORTICULTURE, TOURISM, AND CALL CENTER INDUSTRIES 1–9 (Cornelia Staritz & José Guilherme
Reis eds., 2013) (conducting a gendered analysis of the horticulture, tourism, and call center GVCs in
Honduras, Kenya, and Egypt, respectively).
48. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 23; see also, e.g., INT’L LAB. ORG., TOWARDS BETTER WORK:
UNDERSTANDING LABOUR IN APPAREL GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS (Arianna Rossi et al. eds., 2014);
Stephanie Barrientos, Gary Gereffi & Arianna Rossi, Economic and Social Upgrading in Global
Production Networks: A New Paradigm for a Changing World, 150 INT’L LAB. REV. 319 (2011).
49. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 21.
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picture of who is gaining and losing in GVCs.50 When combined with data
on employment, they will greatly advance our understanding of both
economic and social development opportunities in the global economy.
V. GVCS AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
Today virtually all major bilateral and multilateral donor agencies use
value chain analysis as an instrument of private sector development.51
There are two principal reasons for the increasing popularity of the GVC
approach within the international donor community since the end of the
1990s: first, the accumulating evidence of a link between economic growth
driven by the private sector and poverty reduction; and second, the fact that
global integration of trade and production through GVCs transmits the
pressures of global competition to domestic markets in developing
economies, leaving less space for local firms to design, produce, and
market on their own.52 Given the pervasiveness of GVCs, the challenge is
to design patterns of GVC engagement that balance both competitiveness
and equity objectives while simultaneously generating jobs, higher
productivity, and expanded output.53
There is no simple way to connect GVC analysis to private sector
development, since the firms in a value chain range from transnational
corporations to microenterprises and since the institutional context and
geographic scope of value chains vary enormously.54 Generally, however,
donor interventions have four objectives: strengthening the weakest link to
address potential bottlenecks; improving flows of knowledge and resources
to make all firms in the chain more productive; working on specific links
between firms to improve efficiency; and creating new or alternate links in
the chain to promote diversified outcomes.55
Much of this research and theoretical work has focused on how lead

50. Id.; see also Timothy Sturgeon & Gary Gereffi, Measuring Success in the Global Economy:
International Trade, Industrial Upgrading, and Business Function Outsourcing in Global Value
Chains, TRANSNAT’L CORPS., Aug. 2009, at 1, 19 (illustrating how business functions can be integrated
into GVC analysis, using a new typology and country survey data).
51. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 18.
52. Id.; see also TILMAN ALTENBURG, THE DONOR COMM. FOR ENTER. DEV., DONOR
APPROACHES TO SUPPORTING PRO-POOR VALUE CHAINS 4 (rev. ed. 2007), available at
www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/ resource_en_162916.pdf.
53. ALTENBURG, supra note 52, at 4.
54. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 26.
55. Id.; see also JOHN HUMPHREY & LIZBETH NAVAS-ALEMÁN, INST. OF DEV. STUDIES,
RESEARCH REPORT 63, VALUE CHAINS, DONOR INTERVENTIONS AND POVERTY REDUCTION: A REVIEW
OF DONOR PRACTICE 20–22 (2010).
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firms in specific GVCs have driven this process in various ways.56
Decisions about outsourcing and offshoring are, after all, strategic
calculations made by managers. But such decisions are not made in a
vacuum. The policies and programs of countries and multilateral
institutions set the context for corporate decision-making, and there has
been an evolution in the form and effects of industrial policy along with the
evolution of the business networks that comprise GVCs.
Today the organization of the global economy is entering a new
phase—what some have referred to as a “major inflection point”57—that
could have dramatic implications for firms and workers in emerging and
industrialized countries. As world trade rebounds from the 2008–09
economic crisis, emerging economies have become a major engine of
growth.
VI. THE HETEROGENEITY OF EMERGING ECONOMIES AND
THEIR EXPORT PROFILES
Focusing on a set of seven contemporary emerging economies—
China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, and South Africa—will
give a broader sense of the role of GVCs and development policies in the
developing world. They are all centrally involved in distinct types of
GVCs in agriculture, extractive industries (mining, oil, and gas),
manufacturing, and services.58 Together, these seven emerging economies
account for 45% of the world’s population, 21% of gross domestic product
(GDP), and 25% of global exports, and their GDP growth rates are
substantially higher than the world average (3.4% versus 3.0%).59 The
economic and social characteristics of these countries are quite diverse,
however. The specific roles of these countries in the global economy vary
according to their openness to trade and foreign investment; their
endowments of natural, human, and technological resources; their
geopolitical relationships to the world’s most powerful countries; and the
characteristics of their immediate neighbors.
Although collectively these seven nations have considerable economic
clout, China is the global pacesetter of the group.60 While China and India

56. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 332.
57. Id.; see also Victor K. Fung, Chairman, Fung Global Inst., Speech to the Executive
Committee of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry: Global Supply Chains –
Past Developments, Emerging Trends (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.fungglobalinstitute.org/
en/global-supply-chains-%E2%80%93-past-developments-emerging-trends.
58. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 333.
59. Id.; see infra Table 1.
60. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335.

GEREFFI MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/26/2014 10:01 PM

A GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN PERSPECTIVE

445

are the most populous countries in the world, with 1.35 and 1.24 billion
inhabitants, respectively, China is the undisputed export leader, with $2.0
trillion in exports in 2012.61 China’s export total is greater than that of
South Korea, Russia, India, Brazil, and Mexico combined ($1.9 billion),
and its GDP has grown by over 9% per year for over 30 years.62 It is now
the second-largest economy in the world (after only the United States) and
has overtaken Germany as the world’s largest exporter.63 Notwithstanding
its rapid economic growth, however, its GDP per capita was the secondlowest among these emerging economies in 2012 ($6,090), well ahead of
India’s ($1,489) but less than two-thirds that of Brazil ($11,322) and Russia
($13,993) and just over one-quarter that of South Korea ($22,600).64 On
average, the GDP per capita of these seven emerging economies was about
20% above the world average in 2012.65
The export profiles of these emerging economies indicate the roles
that they play in GVCs. Using a classification scheme that categorizes
traded goods according to primary products plus four types of
manufactured exports (resource-based, low-tech, medium-tech, and hightech),66 Table 2 highlights some of the differences between the export
profiles of these countries. Three of the emerging economies are heavily
oriented toward primary product or resource-based exports: Russia (83%),
Brazil (67%), and South Africa (55%).67 Half of India’s exports are
resource oriented, and another 42% are low-tech (primarily apparel
products) and medium-tech manufactured goods.68 China, South Korea,
and Mexico, by contrast, are heavily involved in manufacturing GVCs.
About 90% of China’s exports are manufactured goods, while a

61. Id.; see infra Table 1.
62. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 1.
63. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see also Andrea Beltramello et al., The Export
Performance of Countries Within Global Value Chains (GVCs) 33 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.
Directorate for Sci., Tech. & Indus., OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Paper No.
2012/02, 2012), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k9bh3gv6647.pdf?
expires=1401142150&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=994DE30A9A0594EA54E5113595ED1875
(documenting the suge in the export of high-technology products by emerging economies).
64. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 1.
65. See infra Table 1.
66. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see also Sanjaya Lall, The Technological Structure
and Performance of Developing Country Manufactured Exports, 1985–98, 28 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 337
(2000) (providing such a scheme).
67. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 2.
68. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 2. Lall’s categories only cover
goods, however, and India is also the world leader in exports of offshore services, with 45% of the
global total. Lall, supra note 66, at 367; see also Fernandez-Stark, Bamber & Gereffi, supra note 32, at
214 (defining and analyzing recent trends in the offshore services industry using a GVC approach).
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preponderance of the exports of South Korea (72%) and Mexico (60%) are
medium-tech (automotive, machinery) and high-tech (mainly electronics)
exports.69
VII. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN GVCS
Industrial policies that take the new realities of GVCs into account
include traditional measures to regulate links to the global economy,
especially the regulation of trade, foreign direct investment, and the
exchange rates used in ISI and EOI policies that sought to elevate the
position of “national champions.”70 Today, GVC-oriented industrial policy
focuses to a greater extent than in the past on the intersection of global and
local actors, and it takes the interests, power, and reach of lead firms and
global suppliers into account, accepts international (and increasingly
regional) business networks as the appropriate field of play, and responds
to pressures from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).71
There are three distinguishable types of industrial policies:
“horizontal” policies that affect the entire national economy; “selective” (or
“vertical”) industrial policies targeted at particular industries or sectors; and
GVC-oriented industrial policies that leverage international supply chain
linkages or dynamics to improve a country’s role in global or regional
value chains.72 “Horizontal” policies focus on the basic building blocks of
competitive national economies, such as education, health, infrastructure,
and R&D expenditures.73 Although these areas all provide attractive
opportunities for private investors, the public sector typically plays a role in
providing widespread access to these factors as public goods. Domestic
industrial policies tend to be “selective” or “vertical” because they are
associated with prioritizing particular industries or activities at the national
level. GVC-oriented industrial policies go beyond the domestic economic
focus of ISI-style policy regimes, which try to recreate entire supply chains
within a national territory. Given the expansion of international production
networks associated with GVCs, this new type of industrial policy
explicitly utilizes extraterritorial linkages that affect a country’s positioning
in global or regional value chains.
Current examples of GVC-oriented industrial policies include efforts
to create and sustain regional supply chains that provide inputs, such as the
69. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 2.
70. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 338; see also Baldwin, supra note 20, at 30–31 (detailing
the policy challenges confronted by newly industrializing states).
71. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 336.
72. Id. at 342–43.
73. Id. at 342.
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East Asian components that have been incorporated into China’s
smartphone exports, that are needed for national export success.74 Case
studies in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa describe efforts to
create regional integration arrangements that could strengthen the export
position of countries in each region by sourcing inputs from regional
neighbors (e.g., textiles and apparel in Central America or sub-Saharan
Africa and minerals processing in sub-Saharan Africa). The case of
Brazil’s efforts to upgrade via GVC-oriented industrial policies is
examined in a bit more detail below.
VIII. THE PRIMARY PRODUCT BATTLEGROUND: BRAZIL’S
SOYBEAN EXPORTS TO CHINA
Large emerging economies that supply primary products to China face
a major challenge: finding ways to increase the technological content of
their exports in order to move into higher value activities. This has been a
vexing issue for Brazil, as China accounted for about 15% of its exports
and imports in 2010.75 From a GVC perspective, the pattern of Brazil’s
exports to China is notably skewed toward products (both primary
commodities and manufactured goods) with very low levels of
processing.76
The soybean value chain is a good example. About 95% of Brazil’s
soybean exports to China in 2009 were unprocessed beans; there were
virtually no exports of soybean meal, flour, or oil to China.77 To pursue its
strategy of promoting the Chinese soybean processing industry, China had
imposed a tariff of 9% on soybean oil imports, while the tariff on
unprocessed soybean imports was only 3%.78 There was also a higher
value-added tax rate in China on imports of products based on processed
soybeans than on unprocessed beans.79 Similar protectionist policies,
including both tariff and non-tariff barriers, have been imposed by the
Chinese government on other primary and processed intermediate products
from Brazil, including leather, iron and steel, and pulp and paper.80
On the import side, Brazil has also been influenced by China’s
structure of international trade. In 1996, low-tech products accounted for
74. Id. at 343.
75. Rhys Jenkins, China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship, 41 J.
CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 21, 22 (2012).
76. Id. at 28.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 29.
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40% of Brazil’s imports from China, while high-tech products accounted
for 25%.81 By 2009, the pattern was nearly reversed: high-tech products
were 41.4% of the total, and low-tech products were 20.8%.82 In terms of
the end use of imports, Brazilian consumer goods imports from China fell
from 44% to 16% between 1996 and 2009, while Brazilian imports of
capital goods more than doubled from 12% to 25%, and parts for capital
goods rose from 12% to 25%.83 Thus, Brazil has fallen to the lowest rungs
of the value-added ladder in its trade with China in recent decades.
While the trade relationship with China is the most severe challenge
for Brazil, the problem is more pervasive.84 For example, Embraer, a
successful Brazilian producer of regional passenger aircraft, depends on
imports for 100% of its aircraft-grade aluminum, despite Brazil’s
abundance of the aluminum ore (bauxite) and rare minerals required for
aircraft-grade alloys. South Africa has had some success in this regard. It
is the largest exporter of catalytic converters for use in vehicle exhaust
systems, products that rely on platinum, a precious metal that is abundant
in South Africa.
IX. INFRASTRUCTURE GROWTH IN ELECTRONICS: FOXCONN IN
BRAZIL
Brazil’s recent efforts to leverage its large and dynamic internal
market to build domestic capabilities in the consumer electronics sector are
instructive of how GVCs intersect with national industrial policies. A
growing middle class in Brazil has begun to demand consumer electronics
on an unprecedented scale.85 Sales of smartphones and other Internetconnected mobile devices are expected to increase dramatically with
Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup soccer championship in 2014 and the
Olympic Summer Games in 2016, and this will drive huge investments in
equipment to upgrade Brazil’s already strained infrastructure for voice
connectivity and data communications.
Thanks to Brazil’s GVC-oriented industrial policies and direct
pressure on the company from policymakers, Foxconn has begun to
assemble iPhones, iPads, and, most recently, iPad minis for Apple in
Brazil.86 While Foxconn is more vertically integrated than most electronics

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 345.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 350.
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manufacturing services firms, it is likely to begin to manufacture
components, including displays, in Brazil. Recent negotiations for a fifth
Foxconn factory in Brazil have included language to suggest that once
production is at 100% (projected to be 2016), Foxconn will be
manufacturing components including cables, cameras, touch-sensor glass,
LED products, and printed-circuit boards.87
Hewlett-Packard (HP) uses three global contract manufacturers in
Brazil (Foxconn, Flextronics, and Jabil Circuit). Their products include
computers, desktop and notebook PCs, workstations, computer servers, and
single- and multi-function printers. Local production accounts for 95% of
HP’s local sales. HP imports low-volume products, such as large-format
printers, high-end servers, and some high-end portable computers, and
makes printer ink cartridges in its own plant using a proprietary
manufacturing process. Most components are imported, except RFID chips
for printer cartridges, which are developed by CEITEC, a local
government-supported semiconductor foundry.
The presence of global contract manufacturers in Brazil creates a
number of immediate advantages. The most obvious is jobs. For example,
Foxconn currently employs 6000 people in Brazil and could add 10,000
more jobs by 2016.88 Additionally, because contract manufacturers serve
multiple customers, their manufacturing capabilities can satisfy local
content requirements for multiple brands. Production capacity is generic
and flexible enough to effectively pool capacity across all high-volume
segments of the electronics industry, and capacity can be switched to
accommodate product categories and firms that are successful in the local
and the export market. The focus of Brazil’s GVC-oriented industrial
policy—attracting investments by contract manufacturers and GVC lead
firms—signals a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of the
electronics GVCs by policymakers. Contract manufacturers provide a
leading-edge, flexible, and scalable platform for local production and
R&D. Lead firms like Apple and HP tend to use the same contractors on a
global basis, and their presence in Brazil lowers the bar for localization.
X. BEYOND “PICKING WINNERS” IN BRAZIL
As the Brazil consumer electronics case suggests, the formation of
industrial policy need not involve policymakers “picking” growth
87. Id.; see also Lisa Wang, Foxconn Invests More in Brazil, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at 13,
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2012/09/20/2003543171.
88. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 351; see also Lorraine Luk, Foxconn to Build Fifth
Brazil Plant, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2012, 6:06 AM ET, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963
90444165804578005722309270246.html.
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industries; rather, it could begin with attempts to improve the performance
of existing industries. This involves a search for mechanisms or activities
that can capture investment and improve a country’s value-adding position
in dynamic segments of GVCs that are in the process of spreading to new
locations or that may already be present in the policymaker’s jurisdiction.89
When Brazil’s policymakers try to capture more value added in local
markets that are already growing rapidly, they are reinforcing success
rather than picking winners.
Of course, policymakers must also be concerned with increased prices
caused by either market slowdowns or government-imposed import
restrictions. Broad economic growth is likely to be inhibited when markets
for products that make the whole economy more efficient, such as smart
phones, computers, and business services, are disrupted. Presumably,
policies that pressure lead firms to add more value locally can be modest
and targeted enough that they do not impede market growth. Once
policymakers accept the proposition that a balanced approach is possible,
the question then becomes how to most effectively craft GVC-oriented
industrial policies.
XI. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: MEXICO’S OPEN ECONOMY
A major element of Mexico’s success is its very high degree of trade
openness: it has free trade agreements with 44 countries, which is more
than twice as many as China and four times as many as Brazil.90
Additionally, while rising wages and fuel prices have made exporting from
China to the United States market increasingly expensive, Mexico’s wages,
which were nearly four times higher than China’s a decade ago, are just
29% higher today.91 Also, while Mexico still has an abundance of cheap
labor, as more than half of its population of 112 million is under the age of
29, its workers are also becoming more skilled, with growing proportions
of graduates in engineering, architecture, and other professions.92
Mexico’s geographical proximity to the United States allows shorter
supply chains, lower transport costs for bulky items, and quicker delivery
times in the context of increasingly popular “fast fashion,” “just in time,”
and other “rapid response” business models.93 As with China, Mexico is a
89. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 353.
90. Adam Thomson, China’s Unlikely Challenger: Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, at 11.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Timothy Sturgeon, Gary Gereffi, Andrew Guinn & Ezequiel Zylberberg, O Brasil nas
Cadeias Globais de Valor: Implicaçaões para a Politica Industrial e de Comércio [Brazil in Global
Value Chains: Implications for Trade and Industrial Policy], REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE COMÉRCIO
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platform for multinational enterprises (MNEs) seeking to locate laborintensive aspects of GVCs (including both manual and knowledge work) in
a country that is both low-cost and close to the huge United States market.
This should also create new project development options and finance
opportunities for domestic and foreign-owned firms.
XII. A NEW ROLE FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Upgrading national firms in this context is not an easy task.94 Because
GVC lead firms encourage suppliers in different countries to compete with
each other for orders, and lead firms often choose to work with the same
global suppliers in multiple locations to reduce transaction costs, states tend
to have less leverage to demand local content requirements or less scope to
develop links to domestic suppliers. In the face of such challenges, some
large emerging economies are shifting their development strategies inward
and relying more extensively on regional production networks buttressed
by regional industrial policy.
An alternative conception of regional integration strategies (including
preferential trade agreements, economic cooperation arrangements, and
regional production networks) could be based on supply-side strategies,
rather than the traditional demand-side considerations that usually justify
regional integration.95 The demand-side logic of regional integration
highlights increases in market size, market access, and foreign direct
investment to create more attractive import markets. The supply-side
approach would view regional integration as a necessary condition to create
scale economies and complementarities that can drive more production and
processing and thus higher value exports from the regions made up of small
economies (e.g., the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade
Agreement) or large ones (e.g., the North American Free Trade
Agreement).
XIII. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL
ECONOMIES
Large emerging economies have more options to upgrade within
GVCs than small economies. Large emerging economies can focus on
manufactured exports, as China and Mexico have done since the mid1990s, but they can also reorient their productive capacity to serve

EXTERIOR [R.B.C.E.], Apr.–June 2013, at 26, 31 (Braz.), translated at http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/
2013-05-22_Sturgeon_et_al_Funcex_article_submitted.pdf.
94. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 338.
95. Id. at 339.
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domestic demand if export markets become less attractive. While both
small and large countries can upgrade at the regional level by diversifying
or adding new capabilities that are not available at the national level, large
countries have more leverage in such arrangements. Large countries with
high potential for market growth (such as the BRICs) can also institute
policies to drive FDI in technology- and capital-intensive sectors, such as
electronics and motor vehicles.
Small countries have fewer options. Their market size is not big
enough to attract FDI in the local market, and domestic firms tend to be
small-scale and less advanced. The regional organization of some GVCs,
however, has created opportunities for smaller countries to leverage low
costs and proximity to large markets to build export capacities in
specialized GVC niches (e.g., intermediate goods) in the context of
regional production systems. Costa Rica, for example, has supply-side
constraints related to productive capacity and skills and conceivably could
partner with Mexico to enhance its training programs and skills
development. Nicaragua, whose apparel firms have been buying textiles
from East Asia, would benefit from supply arrangements with textile firms
in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In sum, specialization and
regional GVC linkages matter for political and economic integration in a
way that was not the case previously.
Recently there is a growing concern in both developed and developing
countries that the economic gains from participating in global supply
chains do not necessarily translate into good jobs or stable employment and
that, in the worst case, economic upgrading may be linked to a significant
deterioration of labor conditions, or social downgrading.96 This raises the
question of the extent to which global supply chains are “inclusive” or
“exclusive” in their facilitation of the upgrading of lower-level firms in the
chain.97 This kind of research will require the development of precise
indicators of upgrading (economic, social, or environmental) that are
relevant to supplier firms and the countries where they are located.
Information about upgrading and downgrading outcomes will require
interviews with firms across the supply chain to identify mechanisms and
outcomes that address this issue, the use of quantitative measures to allow
the development of empirical indicators for each variable, and appropriate
generalizations from these findings.

96. Gereffi & Lee, supra note 31, at 29; see also Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, supra note 48, at
330–32 (arguing for the need to link economic and social upgrading).
97. Gereffi & Lee, supra note 31, at 30.
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XIV. POLICY CHALLENGES IN BRAZIL
Like China, Brazil has a large internal market, allowing it to
implement industrial policies that would be impossible for a smaller
country (e.g., local content regulations and tax breaks).98 It also lies at the
core of Mercosur, the regional trade pact that links Brazil to several other
South American economies. The question is: what sort of industrial
policies make sense given the historical moment? Should Brazil pursue
policies of the past and seek to develop fully independent domestic
industries separate from GVCs? Should it pursue the same low-valueadded business functions that have driven growth in China and Mexico?
Or should it seek to capture more of the new, higher-value-added functions
that are being hived off into GVCs today?
A dynamic, adaptive, and evidence-based policymaking process is
called for in Brazil. Chief among the challenges is the complexity and
instability of the country’s industrial policy regime.99 Because policies
change constantly, companies are having trouble projecting into the future.
For example, executives at electronics firms in Brazil indicated that
uncertainty related to rapidly shifting local production incentives
(Processos Produtivos Básicos, or PPBs) and import tariff levels have been
significant constraints to growth. Such uncertainty tends to impact small
and medium-size enterprises more significantly than large firms because
small firms do not have clout with policymakers in Brazil.
Policy uncertainty is just one of the many elements of what has come
to be known as the “Brazil cost.” The added costs associated with working
in Brazil include poor infrastructure, excessive layers of bureaucracy,
corruption, and high interest rates. According to the World Bank’s “Doing
Business 2013” rankings, Brazil ranks 130th in the world in ease of doing
business, behind China and Russia, and it ranks 156th in ease of paying
taxes. Interviews with industry executives reflect the fact that while
industrial policy interventions are needed, they will be for naught unless
the broader issue of the “Brazil cost” is tackled as well. Thus, while
Brazil’s “Third Way Developmentalism” seeks to put foreign and domestic
capital on the same footing, multinational firms unaccustomed to the
market remain at a disadvantage.
CONCLUSION
Economic globalization is a byproduct of international production and
trade networks organized by transnational firms, and it is embedded in
98. Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 32.
99. Id. at 37.
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various kinds of regulation, including rules of the game established by
international institutions, national government policies, and various forms
of private governance that non-state actors use to manage their activities in
GVCs.100 Public governance will likely be called upon to play a stronger
role in supplementing and reinforcing corporate codes of conduct, product
certifications, process standards, and other voluntary, non-governmental
types of private governance that have proliferated in the last two decades,
and multi-stakeholder initiatives involving both public and private actors
will arise to deal with collective action problems.
The challenge will be to link economic and social upgrading of both
material work conditions and the quantity and quality of jobs created in
contemporary GVCs.101 For developing countries, the trade, investment,
and knowledge flows that underpin GVCs provide mechanisms for rapid
learning, innovation, and industrial upgrading.102 GVCs can provide local
firms with better access to information, open up new markets, and create
opportunities for fast technological learning and skill acquisition. Because
transactions and investments linked to GVCs typically come with quality
control systems and prevailing global business standards that exceed those
in developing countries, enterprises and individuals in developing countries
can acquire new competencies and skills by participating in GVCs.
Still, GVCs are not a panacea for development. Very rapid or
“compressed” GVC-driven development can create a host of new economic
and social policy challenges in areas such as health care and education.103
GVCs can create barriers to learning and drive uneven development over
time, even as they trigger rapid industrial upgrading, because of the
geographic and organizational disjunctures that often exist between
innovation and production. There is considerable evidence that greater
profits accrue to those “lead firms” in the value chain that control branding
and product conception (e.g., Apple) and to the “platform leaders” that
provide core technologies and advanced components (e.g., Intel). At the
same time, contract manufacturers and business process outsourcing
service providers (e.g., call centers) tend to earn slim profits and may never
develop the autonomy or capabilities needed to develop and market their
100. Gereffi, supra note 10, at 21; see also Frederick Mayer & Gary Gereffi, Regulation and
Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, art. 11, at
8 (2010) (formulating a set of propositions about the limited role of private governance in GVCs).
101. Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, supra note 48, at 319, 322 (offering preliminary findings on
economic and social upgrading).
102. Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 33.
103. Id.; see also D. Hugh Whittaker et al., Compressed Development, STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV.,
Dec. 2010, at 439 (identifying the distinct features of “compressed” development in the contemporary
global economy).
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own branded products. Typically, firms that provide routine assembly
tasks and other simple services within GVCs earn less, pay their workers
less, and are more vulnerable to business cycles, not least because they are
required to support large-scale employment and fixed capital.104
Large multinational corporations tend to be the most important
suppliers and service providers in GVCs, thus crowding out opportunities
for local firms.105 If low-value-added activities dominate a specific country
or region, then consequences for economic performance and social welfare
can be profound. Specifically, entrenchment in narrow, routine, low-valueadded activities can lock firms and national industries into unprofitable and
intellectually narrow segments of the value chain. Learning might be rapid
at first, but over time such limits can become acute, especially if lead firms
in GVCs move to new sites for low-cost production and more promising
markets.106
What is the role of policy in the current era? Economic globalization
is mainly an artifact of corporate strategy. Top managers and corporate
board members make decisions every day about what to invest in and
where to invest. Conceptually this seems simple enough, but firm activities
frequently transcend national boundaries. There is a growing mismatch
between the activities of firms and the economies, policies, and politics of
nation-states. Domestic rules provide only one element in the fabric of
global governance that large MNEs consider.107
Several major features highlight the distinctive nature of GVCoriented industrial policies. One is the role of global suppliers. GVCoriented industrial policies require an increasingly sophisticated
understanding of the global-scale patterns of industrial organization that
have come to the fore in GVCs since at least the 1990s.108 Lead firms are
relying on global suppliers and intermediaries for an array of processes,
specialized inputs, and services, and they demand that their most important
suppliers have a global presence. Hence suppliers, not lead firms, are
making many of the new investments that developing countries are seeking
to capture. In many cases, suppliers generate the bulk of exports as well.

104. Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 33; see also Boy Lüthje, Electronics
Contract Manufacturing: Global Production and the International Division of Labor in the Age of the
Internet, 9 INDUS. & INNOVATION 227 (2002) (documenting the rise of network-based mass production
in electronics manufacturing services).
105. Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 34.
106. Id.; see also John Humphrey & Hubert Schmitz, How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains
Affect Upgrading in Industrial Clusters?, 36 REGIONAL STUD. 1017 (2002).
107. Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 33–34.
108. Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 353.
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The capability to serve multiple customers also takes on heightened
importance.109 Thus, it is no accident that Brazil sought investments from
Foxconn, rather than Apple, in its desire for iPhones and iPads to be
produced in the country for domestic consumption and export elsewhere in
Latin America.
A second feature of industrial policies in the GVC era is global
sourcing and value chain specialization. Policies that promote linkages to
GVCs have very different aims than traditional industrial policies that
intend to build full-blown, vertically integrated domestic industries.
Policies can target specialized niches in GVCs. These can be higher-value
niches suited to existing capabilities, or they can be generic capabilities
pooled across foreign investors. Either of these can serve both domestic
and export markets. This sort of value chain specialization assumes an
ongoing dependence on imported inputs and services. Global sourcing
means that the entire value chain may never be captured, but it also assures
ongoing involvement in leading-edge technologies, standards, and industry
best practices.
Third, firms in emerging economies like China and Brazil are seeking
to move to the head of GVCs, regionally if not globally. Encouraging
global suppliers to establish facilities within a country has long-term
advantages. Local lead firms can rely on global suppliers in their midst and
on broader GVCs for a wide range of inputs and services, from design to
production to logistics to marketing and distribution. This can lower risk
and barriers to entry for local firms, provide access to capabilities and scale
that far outstrip what is available domestically, and ensure that products
and services are up to date.
The use of industrial policies by emerging economy policymakers
should not come as a big surprise. Both developed and developing
countries have deployed these policies in the past, often with considerable
sophistication, as in the case of East Asian economies such as Japan, South
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and now China. Looking towards the future,
the traditional rulemaking and finance-oriented international organizations
of the Washington Consensus era, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the
World Bank, face the challenge of constructing a new global economic
order that aligns with the shifting roles of both the emerging and developed
economies. A stable foundation for sustainable development will require
both bold vision and a flexible pragmatism to guide a new generation of
inclusive growth policies and institutional arrangements within the global
economy.
109. Id. at 354.
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FIGURE 1: FIVE TYPES OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN
GOVERNANCE110

TABLE 1. SEVEN SELECTED EMERGING ECONOMIES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 2012111
Country
China
South Korea
Russia
Mexico
India
Brazil
South Africa
Total or Avg.
World Total
% of World Total

Population Exports
GDP
GDP/capita GDP/capita GDP growth
(Millions)¹ ($Billions)² ($Billions)¹
(USD)¹
(PPP)¹
YoY (%)¹
1,351
$2,049
$8,227
$6,090
$9,083
7.8
50
$548
$1,130
$22,600
$30,801
2.0
144
$525
$2,015
$13,993
$23,501
3.4
115
$371
$1,115
$9,696
$16,734
3.8
1,237
$290
$1,842
$1,489
$3,813
3.2
199
$243
$2,253
$11,322
$11,716
0.9
51
$87
$384
$9,752
$11,255
2.5
3,147
$4,113
$16,966
$10,706
$15,272
3.4
7,095
45%

$16,457
25%

$84,970
21%

$11,365
94%

$12,700
120%

Percent of GDP³
Agriculture Industry Services
10
45
45
3
39
58
4
36
60
4
36
61
17
26
57
5
26
68
3
28
69
7
33
61

3.0
112%

110. Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 78,
89 (2005).
111. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/; UN COMTRADE DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/; World
Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi.
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TABLE 2. EXPORT PROFILES OF EMERGING ECONOMIES, 20002012112

China
South Korea
Russia
Mexico
India
Brazil
South Africa

Share of exports by sector*
MediumPrimary Resource
Low-Tech
Tech
Products Based
2%
9%
31%
24%
1%
19%
9%
43%
53%
30%
2%
9%
17%
8%
9%
39%
12%
36%
23%
19%
48%
19%
5%
19%
29%
26%
5%
27%

HighTech
33%
27%
1%
23%
8%
5%
3%

Total
Change in
Export total export
Value
value,
($Billions) 2000-2012
2049
722%
548
218%
525
409%
371
123%
290
584%
243
340%
87
230%

*Exports totals do not include uncategorized exports, and therefore they may not equal 100%.

112. UN COMTRADE DATABASE, supra note 111.

Percentage point change in
share of exports by sector, 2000-2012
Medium- HighPrimary Resource
Low-Tech
Tech
Tech
Products Based
-4
-1
-10
4
11
0
7
-7
10
-9
12
5
-3
-3
-2
5
3
-6
2
-6
-2
8
-16
8
3
24
-4
-7
-6
-8
12
-4
-5
1
-1
Legend:

x ≤ -6

-5 ≤ x < 0 0 ≤ x ≤ 9

x ≥ 10

